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Introduction 
 
During the Civil War in Syria in 2011, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) suddenly 
appeared in the conflict and became internationally known for its explicit use of violence. 
Beheadings, torture, and the targeting of civilians are a normality for the organisation. ISIS 
rapidly gained territory and influence in the Syrian civil war and formed a powerful group in 
the Syrian Civil War who strictly controlled its subjects in its territory. When ISIS in the 
summer of 2014 announced the creation of the caliphate, it achieved its intentions of forming 
a Sunni state in which its subjects would obey the caliph and live in accordance with the 
traditional strict sectarian interpretation of the Islam. During social revolutions, previously 
excluded groups unify to become the central authority and change society and its political 
structures (Skocpol 1988). ISIS also rapidly mobilised former out-groups to and replaced the 
former elite with the creation of its caliphate. Therefore, ISIS can be understood as a social 
revolutionary movement, because ISIS’s rapidly emerged in the Syrian civil war and is aiming 
to drastically change the political power institutions and society by massive mobilisation of 
civilians.    
 Considering ISIS from a social revolutionary perspective will present a new 
dimension on ISIS’s objective of constructing a state in Iraq and Syria. ISIS tends to be 
analysed as an insurgent or as a terrorist group fighting against the other religious and ethnic 
groups in Iraq and Syria, but the revolutionary dimension of ISIS’s objective tends to be 
ignored. Linking ISIS to social revolutions will shed a light on the progression and the 
operability of the organisation. The use of violence of the organisation could be understood by 
considering ISIS’s objective of forming an Islamic state, and hence pursuing a revolution. In 
addition, viewing ISIS from a social revolutionary perspective can contribute to our 
understanding of the use of terrorism, and guerrilla tactics employed by the fighting religious 
groups as their use of violence can be related to their own revolutionary objective. At the same 
time, taking a social revolution point of view could explain how ISIS uses violence to achieve 
its objective.  
 ISIS’s strict sectarian interpretation of the Islam and propaganda presents a great 
concern for Muslim ethnic groups in Iraq and Syria, but also non-Sunni religious group in the 
region. ISIS has proven to be a threat in the civil war in Syria and the other non-Islamic groups. 
Hence, studying ISIS from the perspective of a revolutionary perspective on ISIS can 
contribute to understanding the group’s activity and its use of violence in Iraq and Syria. By 
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considering ISIS as a movement driven by revolutionary change, the use of violence can be 
considered and can give rise to the formation of a counter strategy. In addition, considering 
ISIS from a social revolutionary perspective will improve our understanding of ISIS’s role in 
Iraq and Syria and its process of forming a state. Lastly, for policy makers, considering ISIS as 
not solely a terrorist group or as an insurgent, but linking this to its ideological revolutionary 
objective will also provide an understanding of the group’s strategy. Therefore, by 
understanding ISIS as a social revolutionary group, the motivation of the group will have to be 
incorporated to avoid the rise of new revolutionary/terrorist groups.  
 An essential element in the analysis of ISIS as a social revolutionary group will 
be its use of violence to form and secure its revolution. The organisation seems to have a violent 
strategy which fits with its ongoing objective of consolidating and expanding its revolutionary 
objective. For that reason, the following research question will be addressed: how does ISIS 
use violence to pursue its revolution? This thesis will consider how violence is used by ISIS to 
achieve its revolutionary objective of creating an Islamic State. The main argument is that ISIS 
uses violence to protect and expand its revolutionary objective of creating and expanding its 
Islamic state. In the consideration of the revolutionary process of ISIS and its strategic use of 
violence, the hypothesis will be that ISIS is pursuing its revolution by violently filtering its 
population on who fits with its ideology or can be forced into compliance to create a 
homogeneous revolutionary group, but also that its violent strategy functions to defeat its 
enemies and expand its caliphate.   
 By tracing the development of the organisation and evaluating its process 
towards its main objective of forming a state, the revolutionary objective of the organisation 
can be analysed. Moreover, process tracing permits a deeper analysis of the creation of ISIS’s 
violent strategy. Tracing the rise of the organisation and relating the identity of the group to 
the ideology and violence will develop the revolutionary context of the organisation. The 
temporal dimension in which ISIS’s use of violence will be considered is between 2014-2016. 
However, different historical events (the rise of ISIS in the wake of the Iraq war, the entrance 
of ISIS in the Syrian civil war, and the creation of the Caliphate) have contributed to the 
development of the organisation. These events could be considered in the analysis within the 
historical context, but will only be considered to support the rise of the organisation. The 
progression of the counter strategy by the international community and the local fractions 
continues and are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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 Another research method adopted in this thesis is the use primary sources such 
as the magazine from ISIS which exposes the dynamics within the organisation. In addition, 
the primary sources in combination with supplementary secondary studies can be used to 
understand the revolutionary objective as envisioned by the organisation. Terrorist 
organisations frequently publish their views to gain support and publicise their message and 
ideology. ISIS has published its ideology in their magazines called Dabiq and Rumiyah. For 
that reason, these magazines can be used for analysing of the revolution and to illustrate their 
ideology, but also as they present a rather idyllic image of how life is within the organisation. 
 The revolutionary element and ISIS’ use of violence will be evaluated by first 
considering the literature on ISIS’s roots and its use of violence, but also the literature on social 
revolutions. In this chapter, the different scholarly positions and characterisations of ISIS will 
be considered. Especially in the light of how the group has come to existence, but also the 
different scholarly perceptions of the groups use of violence, and how the group uses violence 
to communicate its ideology and objectives.  A last part of the literature review will consider 
the theories and literature on social revolutions and especially on Islamic social revolutions.  
 The second chapter will develop the context in which the revolutionary 
movement came to existence. This chapter illustrates the broader context in which the 
organisation was formed and how the identity was constructed between the aftermath of the 
Iraq War in 2003 and the creation of the caliphate in 2014. The focus within this chapter will 
be on the exclusion of Sunni Muslims in Iraq and Syria who would later join ISIS. It is also 
necessary to illustrate the break up between Al-Qaeda and ISIS. This split from Al-Qaeda after 
the Iraq war and during the rebuilding process of the Iraqi government and the political 
institutions. The organisation broke with Al-Qaeda based on an ideological rift in which ISIS 
deemed Al-Qaeda as too soft and their revolution to be unfolding too slow. The combination 
of these factors has enabled ISIS to become and pursue its own strategy. 
 While the historical context can illustrate the revolutionary roots of the 
organisation, the religious component is at the centre of the ideology of the organisation. 
Consequently, the religious element of the organisation needs to be developed in order to 
portray the identity of the group and how the group’s use of violence enforces the cohesion of 
the group. In addition, it seems that violence also has the purpose of reinforcing the revolution. 
In order to make sense of the ISIS’s instrumental use of violence against its enemies and out-
groups in relation to its religious identity, ISIS’s own publications might shed a light on the 
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legitimisation of religious violence. Therefore, considering the magazines of ISIS can 
contribute to strengthen the revolutionary process of the organisation and to conceptualise the 
groups identity. The propaganda should, however, be treated carefully, because they provide a 
very biased view of the progression of ISIS’s revolution. 
 The fifth chapter will address the group’s use of propaganda and the use of 
violence within the caliphate. The image ISIS projects of their revolution as it could increase 
support and can legitimise ISIS’s rule over their territory. The secondary sources suggest that 
there is a blatant contrast between its own portrayal of life within the caliphate and the use of 
violence by ISIS against its citizens. The actual living conditions within the state created by 
ISIS might illustrate how ISIS treats its own subjects and enforces its revolutionary ideology.   
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Chapter 1: State of the Art 
 
ISIS gained global attention during the Syrian civil war as it started fighting both the Syrian 
army and the rebels, but also by its violent nature against the civilians.  The literature on ISIS 
can be categorised into three broad debates. The first debate is transfixed on the historical roots 
of ISIS and whether the rise of ISIS was a product of the American-led invasion in Iraq in 2003 
or stems from the inner conflicts within Al-Qaeda. The second debate centres on ISIS’s use of 
violence against its enemies in relation to its religion. The last debate focuses on ISIS’s 
propaganda. This debate puts forward that violence within the group is used to create a coherent 
revolutionary group or whether the use of violence is embodied by the revolutionaries. In 
addition, this literature review indicates the debate on social revolutions literature by linking 
the outbreak of revolutions to the use of violence in the Middle East. The debate on social 
revolutions is constructed with on the one hand classical understandings of revolutions 
unfolding as rapid movements restructuring the state, and on the other hand, contemporary 
perceptions introducing this perspective of social revolutions being achieved by violent means 
such as civil wars and terrorist strategies.  
 
Historical roots of ISIS 
A first group of authors tend to focus on the historical development of the organisation. In his 
book, the American scholar of militant Islamism William McCants traces the roots of ISIS back 
to the ideological differences with Al-Qaeda after the creation of the predecessor of ISIS in 
2003 in Iraq1, but also analyses its Islamic ideology (McCants 2015). He argues that the 
savagery of the organisation originates from its literal interpretation of the Qur’an and the 
Sharia, and that ISIS considered Al-Qaeda to be ignoring the implementation of these religious 
texts within Al-Qaeda’s territory. British political scientist Holbrook also analyses the rise of 
ISIS, but he focuses on the organisational differences between Al-Qaeda and ISIS (2015, 96). 
Unlike McCants, Holbrook’s article sheds a different light on the foundation of ISIS and its 
competition with Al-Qaeda, because Holbrook argues that ISIS separated from Al-Qaeda due 
to ISIS getting out of control of the al-Qaeda leaders. Both authors carefully illustrate the 
                                                 
1 ISIS’ split from Al-Qaeda has been a gradual process which started due to the, in ISIS’s perspective weak 
strategy of Al-Qaeda and inaction against the non-Sunni enemies in the Middle East. While this sentiment arose 
already in 2006, the definitive split only came about when ISIS started participating in the Syrian Civil War in 
2011 
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conflict between Al-Qaeda and ISIS by considering English and Arabic primary sources such 
as the correspondence between Al-Qaeda and reports from international organisations 
monitoring the region. However, both McCants and Holbrook ignore the regional component 
of ISIS’s development in Iraq. They predominantly focus on the historical context of the rise 
of ISIS, but remain too focused on the ideological differences between al-Qaeda and ISIS in 
their analysis on the historical background. Their analysis is primarily a study of the groups 
historical roots rather than an examination of the broader revolutionary objective of ISIS.  
  Unlike McCants and Holbrook, British political scientist Turner only considers 
the role of ISIS in the Syrian civil war and links it to ISIS rejecting Al-Qaeda’s instructions of 
remaining the Al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria. In his article on the strategic differences between Al-
Qaeda and ISIS, Turner argues that the rise of ISIS comes from when it ignored Al-Qaeda’s 
order to resign in the Syrian civil war in in 2013 and let Al-Nusra be the Al-Qaeda affiliate in 
Syria. While ISIS would function as Al-Qaeda’s organisation in Iraq, al-Nusra would have 
authority in Syria and fight in the Syrian civil war on behalf of Al-Qaeda (Turner 2015, 217–
18). Turner agrees with McCants that ISIS expanded due to the competition among jihadists 
groups, but also argues that ISIS could develop because social groups are consistently excluded 
from the political process and are barely represented in politics (Turner 2015, 210) The weak 
Shia state building practice after the American invasion in Iraq in 2003, and the ideological 
differences between Al-Qaeda and ISIS together resulted in the rise of ISIS.  
  In contrast to McCants, Holbrook, and Turner, Joffe relates the origin of the 
organisation back to the geopolitical situation, as he illustrates that the American-led invasion 
in Iraq in 2003 replaced the Iraqi Sunni government with a Shia-led government which 
excluded the Sunni majority. As an effect of the newly installed weak Shia government, 
between 2003-2006, ISIS profited from chaos created by the lack of government control in Iraq 
and the marginalisation of Sunni groups, and seized control as it formed an inclusive 
organisation for the marginalised Sunnis in the aftermath of the Iraq War in 2003 in which the 
state’s control broke down. Similarly, he argues that the Sunni’s suffered as a majority and 
were discriminated in Syria under Assad’s Alawite regime (Joffé 2016, 5). Both Turner, and 
Joffe illustrate the link between the rise of ISIS and the Iraq war, it seems that the invasion in 
Iraq only provided a vacuum in which ISIS could independently develop from Al-Qaeda in 
2006 and exploit the lack of government control in Iraq.  
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  The literature introduced two different explanations for the rise of ISIS with the 
first being the separation of ISIS from Al-Qaeda, and the second one being the American-led 
war in Iraq. This thesis will trace the development of ISIS as an interplay between the two 
factors. Whereas ISIS’s ideological differences and frustration with Al-Qaeda’s inaction 
accounts for ISIS’s identity, the chaos and the competition among religious groups and tribes 
in Iraq in the Civil war after 2003 enabled ISIS to develop and express its ideology.  
 
ISIS and the centrality of religious violence 
While one group of scholars focuses on the historical origins of ISIS, another element, the 
centrality of religion, draws attention from scholars who emphasise the connection between 
religion and violence within ISIS. Although McCants provides a thorough historical account 
on the rise of ISIS and the roots of the organisation, he also illustrates the centrality of the 
religious beliefs and jihadism within the group. ISIS differentiated itself from its enemies by 
its sectarian interpretation of the Islam and its agenda to defeat the other ethnic groups to form 
an Islamic State and enforce the Qur’an and the Sharia within its territory. He argues that ISIS 
was frustrated about Al-Qaeda’s lack of Islamic leadership in the region inactiveness and “low-
key” Islamic agenda led to a strict adoption of the Qur’an and the Sharia in his organisation 
(2015, 34).  
 In contrast, Fromson and Simon, Byman, and Katagiri, elaborate on the Islamist 
characteristic of the group. The article of American researcher Fromson and American 
terrorism scholar Simon on the religious strategy and identity of ISIS focuses on the long-term 
political implementation and motivation of ISIS as they outline the strength of its violent 
strategy. Between 2006-2008, ISIS focused on unifying the Sunni communities (ummah), and 
rule over the territory with a strict Islamic agenda By relying on news sources on the 
progression of the Syrian Civil War, their analysis critically assesses how ISIS expanded in 
Syria. They assert that ISIS’s strength comes from forming an organisation representing the 
Sunni tribes in Iraq and Syria  (Fromson and Simon 2015, 9–13). On the other hand, American 
historian Byman and American Security scholar Katagiri exemplify ISIS’s weakness as its 
strict religious attitude would alienate the population’s support for its radical Islamic agenda 
(Byman 2015; Katagiri 2015, 550). Therefore, they are excluding moderate Sunnis from its 
Islamic state which might wane support from ISIS, as they maintain a rather extreme vision on 
the Islam which might not appeal to the moderate Sunnis.  
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 A similar argument can be identified in the article which was published in The Atlantic 
by the American research journalist and political scientist Graeme Wood. He thoroughly 
portrays how the Islamic State developed from a clandestine movement towards a semi-state 
formation with Islamism at its core (Wood 2015). Whereas Fromson and Simon argue that the 
ISIS’s jihadist strategy has contributed to ISIS’s success in the Syrian Civil War, Wood argues 
that ISIS has more state-like responsibilities now that it proclaimed the creation of the 
caliphate. Having announced the creation of the caliphate, requires a population and territory 
over which ISIS can rule and maintain law and order. He argues that ISIS must maintain a 
territory as the caliph needs a territory to rule over its subjects and enforce the Sharia law. 
Wood’s analysis of the centrality of religion within ISIS’s envisioned state provides an 
understanding of how ISIS desires to develop its state and the kind of responsibilities of having 
created the caliphate. However, what is missing in this analysis of ISIS’s aspirations of 
establishing a state, and the accompanied vulnerability of managing their state and how 
violence is utilised to enforce control over their population 
 American terrorism scholar Stern and American extremism scientist Berger 
focus on the relation between extreme Islamism and the terrorist ideology of ISIS (2016). In 
their book, ISIS: The State of Terror, they examine how the religious aspect is politicised by 
ISIS and how terrorism and its religious beliefs are interlinked with each other. They reflect on 
the role of terror against other religious groups and the West in the Syrian civil war and their 
controlled territory in Iraq and how terrorist strategies are applied to communicate the group’s 
ideology and enforce order within their territory. However, they tend to focus on the violent 
implementation of law and order within ISIS’s territory without further analysing the use of 
violence in relation to their objective of creating a state. Moreover, they ignore the relevance 
of Islamic violence as an instrument to achieve the foundation of their state. While these authors 
analysing ISIS in the Middle East have valid points, they tend to focus on news articles and 
barely respond to each other. These secondary articles are all published soon after the creation 
of the caliphate, which hinders the authors to respond to each other’s contributions 
 
ISIS’ message and life within the group 
A last element identified by the literature on ISIS as an organisation is the social mobilisation 
aspect of the organisation. The organisation desired to attract followers by projecting of their 
Islamic message through (social) media. The American military propaganda analyst Farwell 
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has focused on the media strategy of ISIS. In his article, he argues that the  online media 
strategy enabled ISIS to rapidly distribute its message to its supporters (Farwell 2014, 50). His 
brief article analyses how ISIS’s online media strategy functions to attract Western fighters and 
legitimises ISIS’s actions as the followers accept its authority, because the propaganda would 
broaden the support and set an example of how this violent behaviour is acceptable. Berger and 
Morgan analyse the social media campaign of ISIS and argue that this enabled the group to 
attract potential jihadists in around the world, while at the same time boasting its achievements 
(Berger and Morgan 2015). ISIS’ propaganda has created a romantic picture of life within the 
caliphate (General Intelligence and Security Service 2016, 10). In reality, the life of the 
members of ISIS would be dominated by the ISIS’ use of violence to maintain control over 
their followers and the living conditions would be horrendous, in which the subjects are put in 
dysfunctional houses, have no healthcare, women are subjected to sexual violence.   
 
Literature on Social Revolutions 
Huntington, in his book Political Order in Changing Societies, was among the first to 
distinguish between social revolutions and other forms of political resistance. He argued that a 
revolution can be defined as a “rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change […] in the 
political institutions such as parliament and the government, society, leadership and 
governmental activity” (Huntington 1968, 266). Revolutions would create a modernisation 
process within the boundaries of the state. Therefore, Huntington argues that mass 
mobilisations might turn into revolutions and result in a modernisation of the institutions by 
the revolutionary groups. Hence, revolutions would lead to the modernisation of the state. In 
his view, revolutions would occur as the interests of the revolutionaries are not sought after by 
the ruling elite and results in the massive mobilisation of the marginalised citizens and start the 
revolution. Consequently, he argues that revolutions are illustrative in the sense that if 
revolutions succeed, they cause a rapid mass mobilisation of previously excluded citizens who 
become politically active with as a result the modernisation of political institutions.  
 Another influential contribution in the literature on revolutions has been the 
work of the American sociologist Skocpol who has argued that social revolutionary processes 
result in a broader incorporation of the social classes after the revolution (Skocpol 1988, 147). 
In her article, she illustrates that revolutions occurs when the state is in a national crisis in 
which a dominant group will take advantage to revolt. The revolution replaces the established 
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political elite by the revolutionaries and the political and social institutions are replaced to 
include the revolting population. The integration of the revolutionaries would be essential for 
the revolution as this would end the rule of the previous state as these political institutions are 
shaped according the ideas of the revolutionaries. 
 These classical contributions to the study of revolutions and political change 
have been constructed around nationalist revolutions such as the French revolution, and the 
Marxist revolutions such as the Russian and Chinese revolutions. Therefore, they emphasise 
the modernisation element of revolutions and the drastic change in the state’s political 
institutions and political culture by looking at the breakdown of the existing order and the 
installation of the revolutionaries into the ruling elite. Although revolutions indeed indicate an 
essential political and social transformation in their target structure, these classical views are 
straightforward and ignore the importance of the social cohesion and the ideological 
motivations of the revolutionary group. 
 Based on more contemporary revolutions in the Middle East, different 
perspectives on revolutionary process are introduced which tend to focus on the role of violence 
in achieving the objective of the revolution, but also how revolutions unfold in the Middle East. 
For instance, the American political scientists Fearon and Laitin argue, in their quantitative 
cross sectional study on the rise of violence and civil wars, the relationship between social 
revolutions and the escalation into civil wars and the rise of ethnic nationalism since the Cold 
War in the Second and Third World (2003, 75). They maintain that the revolutions following 
the Iranian Revolution have mainly risen due to ethnic nationalism and more often have 
resulted in civil wars or other violent struggles. In their article, they maintain that Skocpol’s 
view on social revolutions ignores the spill over of mass protests and revolts into rebellion. 
 Similarly, the French historians Boroumand and Boroumand have argued in 
their article on the relationship between revolutions in the Middle East and terrorism, that 
terrorism is the preferred strategy of Islamist groups aiming to overthrow the national regime, 
this strategy would achieve the revolutionary change. Their argument rests upon the use of 
terrorism by Shia militias during the Iranian revolution which has formed the basis for 
consecutive revolutionary groups in the Middle Eastern region to convey the revolutionary 
groups’ message (Boroumand and Boroumand 2002). Boroumand and Boroumand criticises 
Skocpol’s by neglecting the role of ideology for the creation of social revolutions, as they argue 
that revolutionary terrorists in the Middle East are ethnic groups with a different religions and 
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backgrounds rather than revolutions being centred on social classes. In addition, the use of 
terrorism by Shia militias in Iran proved to other Sunni fractions how terrorist strategies and 
guerrilla warfare can be employed for the sake of the revolutionary objectives of Sunni 
fractions after the succession of the Iranian revolution 
 The use of violence in social revolutions has specifically gained attention by 
American sociologist Berman who reviews the relation between Islamism and revolutions as 
she argues that Islam has a revolutionary aspect as it slowly started to become a central element 
in Egyptian society (Berman 2003, 257–58). She argues that the Islamists wanted to become 
more politically pronounced, but the political institutions in Egypt appeared to be too strong. 
For that reason, the Islamists refocused their efforts to the Egyptian society to gradually 
incorporate them. Hence over time, Egyptian civil society turned to the Islam, because the 
Islamists offered accessible social-religious institutions and represented them in the Egyptian 
society. Berman’s idea of viewing revolutions as a cultural process with the possibility of being 
independent from political institutions accurately reflects how religion can become at the centre 
of the revolution by offering the marginalised out-groups security and how the religious 
revolution develops alongside the political authority and institutions. In contrast, Fairbanks has 
elaborated on the outbreak of social revolutions in Islamic countries by considering violent 
strategies to achieve the revolutionary objective. He argues that in the Islamic revolutions tend 
to become violent as the revolutionaries would use violence to draw attention and gain popular 
support of the Islamic societies in the Middle East (2007, 44). In addition, terrorist attacks 
could create maximum damage by using minimum means. 
 Similar to Berman, Beck has argued in his article on the spread of revolutions 
in the Arab Spring, that revolutions in the Middle East have a pronounced transnational nature. 
During these revolutions, the revolutionaries hide among the affiliated tribes which are 
harboured across national borders, but also as the revolutionaries would use violent strategies 
to topple the power structures and consequently pass the border to avoid being targeted by 
counter-revolutionaries (Beck 2014, 198). He argues that revolutions in the Middle East are 
frequently transnational, because the revolutionaries are operating from neighbouring 
countries, but also that the interconnectedness between the Islamic revolutionary groups has 
increased. Both Berman and Beck challenge Huntington and Skocpol’s argument of 
revolutions being state centred and illustrating the escalation of violence in social revolutions 
in Arabic countries. 
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The perception of ISIS being a revolutionary organisation will fit in the contemporary debates 
on revolutions. ISIS’ revolutionary attitude can be illustrated by considering the historical 
context, the role of religious violence, and the use of violence within the organisation in 
relation. This thesis will combine these perspectives to illustrate how ISIS uses violence to 
pursue its revolution and contribute to the literature on ISIS how these perspectives can shed a 
light on revolutions.  In addition, by linking social revolutions to ISIS, one can make sense of 
how ISIS pursues its objective of forming a caliphate and violently pursuing the construction 
of the ummah. For that reason, this thesis will add to the current literature by illustrating how 
violence can be used by revolutionary groups.  
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Chapter 2: the rise and expansion of ISIS 
 
While ISIS only became internationally known when it started fighting in the Syrian Civil war 
in 2011, the roots of the organisation can be traced to the American-led invasion in Iraq in 
2003. Therefore, in this chapter, it will be argued that ISIS’s ideological differences with Al-
Qaeda shaped the group’s identity and strategic focus, but the Civil War in Iraq provided the 
ideal context for ISIS to grow and expand its territorial control and influence in the region. This 
chapter will explain the rise of ISIS as a consequence of its ideological differences with Al-
Qaeda, but also that ISIS developed by the lack of state control in Iraq and Syria. The Civil 
War in Iraq in 2004-2010, and the Syrian Civil War in 2011 created chaos and weak state 
control which ISIS exploited to expand and secure its control over the population in its territory. 
 The creation and the rise of ISIS can be contributed to three factors. Firstly, 
between 2003-2006, ISIS started to alienate from Al-Qaeda due to vital differences over Al-
Qaeda’s focus on the West rather than fighting against non-Sunni groups in Iraq and ISIS’s 
strategy to control territory and the population by fighting against the Shias, Kurds and other 
non-Sunni militias. The second factor contributing to the rise of ISIS is the American-led 
invasion in Iraq and the following civil war, in which Jihadist organisations such as Al-Qaeda 
and ISIS could freely develop in this political vacuum. A last factor is the entrance of ISIS in 
the Syrian civil war in 2011 and the announcement of its caliphate in 2014.  
 
ISIS’ roots in Al-Qaeda 
Al-Qaeda was founded by Osama bin Laden and several other veterans who fought with the 
Afghans against the Soviet Union in 1988 in Afghanistan as a reaction to the non-Islamic 
colonial powers in the Middle East and North Africa. Al-Qaeda focuses on expelling the 
Western influences in the Middle East and to strengthen the position of the Sunni Muslims in 
relation to the Western crusaders. It forms an umbrella organisation for its affiliates in the 
different states in the Middle East and North Africa. ISIS also started as an Al-Qaeda affiliate, 
but became gradually independent from Al-Qaeda. Both Al-Qaeda and ISIS use jihadism and 
terrorist attacks in their strategy to defeat their enemies.  
 While ISIS’s separation from Al-Qaeda was only publicly announced during the 
Syrian civil war in 2011, the roots of the conflict between  ISIS and Al-Qaeda can already be 
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traced to 2003 when Al-Zarqawi’s led the Iraqi branch of Al-Qaeda, simply named Al-Qaeda 
in Iraq [AQI] (Byman 2015). Al-Zarqawi was a Jordan jihadist who was distressed about the 
maltreatment of Sunnis in the Middle East. Therefore, before Al-Zarqawi led AQI, he helped 
to create the jihadist group called Jund al-Sham2 [the Syrian Division] in Jordan in 1991. When 
he was imprisoned in Jordan between 1992-1999 for the possession weapons, he spread his 
sectarian believes among his inmates. Upon his release from prison in 1999, Al-Zarqawi 
created Jama’at al Tawhid wal Jihad [organisation for Jihad and Monotheism] with whom he 
planned an attack in Jordan. However, this plan was discovered causing him to flee to 
Afghanistan where he was trained in the jihad and fought with Al-Qaeda. In 2003, Al-Zarqawi 
planned the military resistance against the US troops in Iraq by reviving Jama’at al Tawhid wal 
Jihad in Iraq which pledged its loyalty to Al-Qaeda and became AQI (Celso 2015, 23–24). He 
centred sectarianism within AQI by illustrating how the Sunni-groups were targeted by the 
Shias and the Kurds (Joffé 2016, 8). He believed that only the Sunni-Jihadists should be 
released from the control of non-Islamic groups by fighting against these ethnic groups.  
 Initially, in 2004, when Al-Zarqawi’s led AQI, the organisation remained close 
to Al-Qaeda Central’s strategy of fighting the Western troops in Iraq. Under the name of Al-
Qaeda, AQI executed several terrorist attacks against Shia communities and the United 
Nations’ peacekeepers in Bagdad (Kaválek 2015, 10–11). However, between 2004-2006, AQI 
started to alienate from Al-Qaeda Central and its strategy.  AQI independently developed from 
Al-Qaeda Central’s control and started to pursue its jihadist strategy against the religious 
militias in Iraq to expand its control. Due to the lack of control from Al-Qaeda Central, Al-
Zarqawi and AQI concentrated on its sectarian roots and started fighting other religious groups 
such as Kurds, Alevites, and Shia groups in North Iraq. Ideologically, AQI legitimised these 
attacks against these groups as it would liberate the Sunnis from the other religious militias, 
but also as AQI considered that these ethnic groups were infidels, because they rejected to 
divert to the Sunnah (Hashim 2014, 70–71).  
 Al-Qaeda’s strategy concentrated on fighting the far enemy by using terrorist 
attacks against the western troops present in the Middle East by fighting against the Western 
                                                 
2 Before his detainment, Al-Zarqawi started several jihadist groups. In Jordan, he created Jund Al-Sham [the Syria 
Division] but this group was rather quickly dismantled when Al-Zarqawi was imprisoned. The second group, 
Jama’at al Tawhid wal Jihad created in 1999, became obsolete when Al-Zarqawi fled to Afghanistan, but upon he 
revived this organisation in Iraq when he planned the military resistance against the US troops in Iraq (2003). 
Jama’at al Tawhid wal Jihad was in 2004 renamed Tanzim Qaidat Al Jihad Fi Bilad al Rafidayn to indicate its 
alliance with Al-Qaeda. Hence it is known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq or AQI 
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troops, and conducting terrorist attacks in the West such as the attacks in London and Madrid. 
In addition, Al-Qaeda Central believed that the conflict against regional militias would be 
pursued after the defeat of the European and American troops in the Middle East, but also that 
Al-Qaeda should win the “hearts and minds” of the non-Sunni local groups and fight with them 
against the Western enemies. This formation process from being an Al-Qaeda affiliate towards 
an independent organisation was a gradual process in which the distance between AQI and Al-
Qaeda Central, which is located in Afghanistan, created a sense of independence and self-
governance for AQI. 
 
The Iraq war and the development of ISIS 
While the strategical focus of AQI, and later ISIS, can be traced to the separation with Al-
Qaeda, the creation of ISIS cannot solely be attested to these ideological differences. The Iraq 
War and the chaos of the Civil War in Iraq offered the ideal circumstances in which AQI could 
build its organisation and control, because the Iraq War shifted the dynamics of power in Iraq 
and created a competition for power between the fighting groups. In the chaos, AQI could 
expand its influence as it was supported by the Sunni tribes, but also as the state was too weak 
to counter AQI and because the organisation enjoyed sufficient support to resist its enemies.  
 In 2003, the American-led War in Iraq toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein 
after a swift military intervention. Due to the collapse of the Hussein regime in 2004, Iraq was 
in a state of anarchy in which Iraq’s society was divided along tribal and religious lines. These 
tribes all have different religious backgrounds (Christians, Jews, Alevite, Sunnis, Shias) and 
control the population in their territory. In his article on the local population taking sides during 
the war in Afghanistan, Kalyvas explains how local groups are forced to take a position in 
conflicts (Kalyvas 2003). Kalyvas argues that during violent conflicts, the local population will 
support one side of the fighting parties and will form cleavages to support the side which will 
offer protection to the population. In the period during the Iraq Civil War, the Iraqi population 
also formed cleavages. While some local Sunni tribes joined ISI as they shared ISI jihadist 
ideology and siding create a strong unified regional force able to resist the Shias. Other tribes 
sided with ISI, because this would prevent ISI to use violence against the tribes to force them 
in coercion or could provide protection from other tribes.  
 The use of violence by AQI divides the population in the region and identifies 
its enemies, but also coerce groups to accept ISI’s authority in the region. ISI aimed to win 
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support from Sunni tribes who were targeted by the Shia militias and American troops who 
were still stationed in Iraq to assist the Shia government (Kfir 2015, 241). In order to pursue 
its strategy, AQI thrived by the creation of chaos and the weak Shia state control, because this 
enabled ISI to extent its influence and coerce the tribes to side with ISI in return for protection 
(Saltman and Winter 2014, 28). By using violence against the local tribes ISI positioned itself 
as the most powerful Sunni group in North Western Iraq. 
  In 2006, three years after the collapse of the Hussein regime, Al-Zarqawi died 
in an air strike from the United States. Although AQI lost its leader, it rapidly filled this and 
renamed itself to Islamic State in Iraq [ISI] as AQI merged with four minor Sunni-jihadist 
groups causing for the name change to emphasise its ambition of forming an Islamic state in 
Iraq. After the death of Al-Zarqawi, the connection with Al-Qaeda became weaker as the 
communication between the organisations decreased (Joffé 2016, 6). After the formation of ISI 
and its expansion between 2006-2010, ISI lost two of its leaders, Abu Ayyub al-Masri who led 
ISI between 2006-2008 and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi who led ISI between 2008-2010. Under 
their control ISI expanded its control to regions close to Baghdad and to the border region with 
Syria (Hashim 2014, 72–73). The organisation was, however, able to revive from these losses, 
as the ISI leadership rapidly replaced its leaders and in 2010 Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi was 
appointed by ISI to lead organisation.  
 Whereas Al-Zarqawi’s jihadist strategy originates from his personal relationship 
with jihadist thinkers and his personal background as a Sunni in Jordan in the 90s, Al-Baghdadi 
was educated in Qur’an and Sharia studies at the university of Bagdad and obtained his Ph.D. 
in this field. The Sunni Army, was a violent Sunni militia conducting terrorist attacks in major 
Mosul and Bagdad against the Shia government and international peacekeepers (McCants 
2015, 75). Even though he was imprisoned for distributing radical messages in the mosques in 
which he served as an imam, he was not regarded as a high value target and released after 
which he would later join ISI in 2008. Baghdadi was previously active in Samara, Dyalah, and 
Bagdad where he had led a jihadist organisation named the Sunni army. His leadership 
incorporated his tribe, but also the remnants of Al-Baghdadi’s Sunni Army.  
 During his leadership in 2010, ISI constructed its administrative and operative 
order, but also intensified Al-Zarqawi’s sectarian vision. Al-Baghdadi’s experience as an imam 
and leader of the Sunni Army led to an intensification of sectarianism, and a stricter Islamic 
focus of fighting all the apostates (McCants 2015). While Al-Zarqawi was a jihadist and 
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remained a strict central leadership on AQI, Al-Baghdadi had a better understanding of how to 
delegate power to strengthen ISI. ISI’s focus on the Shias and other militias infuriated Al-
Qaeda Central, because ISI ignored Al-Qaeda Central’s instructions to drop the violence 
against the Shia groups and return to fight against the Western presence in Iraq (Turner 2015, 
215). Hence, the Iraq War had an essential role in the development of ISI as it caused the 
collapse of Sunni control and the installation of a weak Shia government. The weak control of 
the Shia government and the tribes and religious militias fighting each other provided this 
context in which ISI could freely develop and exploit this chaos to assume control and unify 
the Sunni tribes.  
 
The Syrian civil war and the construction of the Caliphate 
The spill over of ISI into the Syrian civil war came during the Syrian revolution in 2011, as 
Syrian citizens started protesting for regime change. The protests rapidly escalated into a 
violent conflict between the ununified opposition and the regime. While the Al-Assad regime 
was supported by the Alevite minority, the Syrian Sunni majority was fragmented and created 
the excellent opportunity to install a Sunni-led state in in Syria (Kahf 2014). Similar to the 
Civil War in Iraq, ISI profited from the rise of chaos in Syria, because the opposition was 
divided among religious groups who fought in smaller militias and were not only interested in 
toppling the Al-Assad government, but also tried to gain political influence for their own 
militias.  
 ISI did not gain international attention in the Syrian Civil War until the protests 
in Syria violently escalated into a Civil War and the opposition started fighting each other to 
achieve their own interest of gaining territory and political influence. The multiple regional 
resistance movements were ununified and all fought for their own interests. Jawhat al-Nusra, 
the Al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, seized this moment to pursue the agenda of Al-Qaeda in the 
Syrian Civil War. However, at the same time, ISI also expanded its area of control to include 
territories in North-Eastern Syria and it changed its name into the Islamic State in Iraq and 
Syria [ISIS] (Holbrook 2015, 94). The expansion of ISIS towards Syria, was the last straw for 
Al-Qaeda, and formed the official separation of ISIS from Al-Qaeda. ISI independently 
organised its strategy and became uncontrollable for the leadership of Al-Qaeda. The rebellion 
of Sunnis in Syria, and the Sunni-Syrian members of ISI convinced ISI to fight into the Syrian 
civil war.  
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 In Raqqa in 2014, ISIS announced that it would continue under the name of the 
Islamic State [IS3] and that Al-Baghdadi  would be its caliph (Celso 2015, 28). ISIS’s necessity 
of having declared the caliphate originates from the context in which the effect of having a 
caliph could unite the Muslim fractions, but also legitimise their use of violence in the region, 
as it would fit in the war against the apostates and crusaders. In addition, by declaring the 
caliphate, Al-Baghdadi would gain religious authority and create the Islamic state which was 
ISIS’s objective right from the start. Al-Zarqawi, created AQI to eventually create a sectarian 
Sunni Islamic State which would be the sole authority in Iraq and Syria. The creation of the 
caliphate would broaden the support among Sunni Muslims as the caliphate would unify the 
Muslims now that they all have the same religious leader (Jabareen 2015, 53).  
  
This chapter, illustrated that ISIS developed because of the interaction of two elements. Firstly, 
ISIS pursued its own strategy independent from Al-Qaeda. By abandoning the strategy against 
the Western enemy, ISIS could profit from the chaos of the Iraq Civil War and form a Sunni 
front for and fight the other religious militias. In addition, because of the Shia weak state 
building practice, the organisation profited from the chaos and the lack of state control and 
expand its control in North Western Iraq. While ISIS’s rift with Al-Qaeda facilitated its strategy 
and religious focus, the Civil Wars in Iraq and Syria created the ideal context in which ISIS 
could expand its organisation and control. Furthermore, in the midst of chaos, ISIS develop its 
sectarian strategy which would form an essential component of the group’s strategy in the 
Syrian Civil War in 2011. Lastly, an essential step in ISIS’s history was the creation of the 
caliphate. The creation of the caliphate would realise ISIS objective of forming a Sunni-based 
Islamic State. The next chapter will provide a more in-depth analysis on the group’s use of 
violence and develop an understanding of how this served the revolutionary goal of the 
organisation.  
  
                                                 
3 Even though the organisation calls itself IS, due to practical grammar reasons the abbreviation used in this 
thesis will be ISIS as this will prevents confusion 
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Chapter 3: ISIS’ use of violence against out-groups 
 
During ISIS’s development in Iraq, ISIS pursued a sectarian ideology and strengthen the 
organisation by incorporating the marginalised Iraqi Sunni tribe. The strict conservative 
adoption of the Islam in combination with ISIS’s need to maintain territorial control, caused 
ISIS to rely on violence. By using violence, ISIS could fill the power vacuum which was 
created after the collapse of the Hussein regime and which the weak Shia government failed to 
restore stability and law and order. The Shia’s elite poor state building attempts and weak 
control of violence in the aftermath of the Iraq War enabled ISIS to freely develop without 
strict state control and interference national security forces. ISIS has continuously relied on 
violence, to secure its control over its territory. Violence against other ethnic groups dominates 
ISIS’s agenda and strategy for expanding their influence. For that reason, this chapter will 
provide an analysis of the concept of the jihad which is essential for ISIS’s strategy. Thereafter, 
ISIS’s use of violence will be analysed by considering the articles in ISIS’s magazines Dabiq 
and Rumiyah which expose how the organisation uses violence for its revolutionary objective.  
 
Jihadism and “the Management of Savagery” 
To understand ISIS’s strategy and use of violence, it is firstly useful to consider the Jihad and 
the book explaining this strategy, The Management of Savagery. The Qur’an differentiates two 
types of jihad: the greater jihad which involves the personal struggle to find the true meaning 
of the Islam. Secondly, the lesser jihad is the violent struggle to reinforce faith at the communal 
level (Burchill 2016, 960). For that reason, the lesser jihad contains a revolutionary element as 
it aims to restore the status of the Islam and liberate the Muslims from the infidel rulers (Rich 
2016, 778). In addition, after the jihad, the status of the Islam and the communal faith would 
be restored as the enemies of the Islam are defeated from the Sunni lands. 
 The link between the jihad and the religious objective of expelling foreign 
influences in the region and violence is theorised in Abu Bakr Naji’s book: The Management 
of Savagery. Naji was born in 1961 in Egypt and was an Islamic philosopher and propagandist 
of Al-Qaeda and died in an U.S. airstrike in Pakistan in 2008. In his long and dense theological 
book, Naji aspired to connect the old understanding of the jihad to a contemporary setting by 
offering instructions for how jihad should unfold and how it can contribute to formation of a 
caliphate. According to Naji, the jihad should be executed according to the principles of the 
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Sharia (Naji 2007, 8). Consequently, Naji offers instructions on how the jihad should be 
executed and can contribute to achieve the formation of the ummah and the caliphate. The jihad 
would unify the separate Islamic cells together to fight the apostates and crusaders in the region 
where the jihad is declared and liberate the Sunnis from their non-Sunni leaders. In addition, 
in Naji’s view the jihad would mobilise Sunnis around the world to fight in the region where 
the jihad is declared as all the Sunnis would have the duty to fight for their fellow Muslims. 
Hence, the jihad would create a cohesive Muslims community with a common objective of 
fighting against the enemies trying to destroy the Islam. 
 In the following chapters, The Management of Savagery proceeds by arguing 
how violence can assure the establishment and the consolidation of the Ummah. The liberation 
of the Sunnis would occur by the jihadist strategy of vexation operations (Naji 2007, 22). The 
vexation operations are guerrilla-like strategy to face the enemy as Naji illustrates that these 
strategies would be the most appropriate for the jihadists as it would require a minimum of 
training and would give them the best chance of defeating the enemy. These tactics would 
exhaust the enemies’ economic resources (oil fields and industries), political institutions 
(embassies and ministries) and military bases are targeted. By gaining territory and fighting the 
enemy over time, they can actively create a cohesive society after having expelled the alien 
forces in the Muslim lands. Hence, The Management of Savagery explains that jihadism and 
the vexation of power strategy can result into the creation of a cohesive ummah and the 
formation of a caliphate. 
 
ISIS’s use of violence against non-Islamic out-groups  
Naji instructed, in his reflection on the jihad, that the caliphate can only be created after 
expelling the apostates and crusaders from the Middle East. This idea is also present in ISIS 
online magazines, in which it depicts the out-groups as enemies aiming to destroy the Muslim 
community. As Dabiq has a propaganda objective, it becomes clear that the articles aim to 
mobilise Muslims to join ISIS, but also to separate who is included in ISI’s caliphate and who 
is considered to be its enemy (Saltman and Winter 2014, 50). Dabiq and Rumiyah are written 
by anonymous authors from ISIS’s Al Hayat Media centre, and John Cantile who is an 
American imprisoned by ISIS.  This media centre publishes ISIS’s digital magazines, radio 
podcasts, videos and photo reports of executions, and the management of communication on 
social media.  
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 The issues of the magazines have recurring articles and columns such as: 
updates on successful attacks against ISIS’s enemies and the terrorist attacks they conducted. 
Other themes in the magazine are dedicated to reporting the western enemies’ words on ISIS 
being the enemy, the role of men and their role in the conflict against their enemies, but also 
the role of women and their supporting role as mothers and wives in the caliphate. In between 
the articles in the issues, there are advertisements for their Western readers to join the caliphate, 
but also lists and links to their most streamed videos. Every issue of Dabiq has on the second 
page the following quote of Al-Zarqawi: “The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will 
continue to intensify –by Allah’s permission- until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq [the 
Syrian city]” The focus of the magazine lay on religiously legitimising ISIS and its caliphate 
and encourage the Muslims to migrate to its territory and to justify its actions against the enemy 
(Farwell 2014, 51). The length of the issues varies with Rumiyah having around 30 pages and 
the issues of Dabiq containing between 45-70 pages. The articles of its military attacks 
frequently contain pictures of the soldiers of ISIS being targeted by its enemies, or pictures of 
victims of ISIS’s campaigns to boast its accomplishments.  
 In an article on the significance of having established the caliphate, published 
in the first issue of Dabiq in July 2014, ISIS stated that the use of violence is permitted against 
its enemies (Dabiq 1, 2014a, 6). In this short article in the beginning of the issue, Dabiq explains 
the implications of declaring the Caliphate and the urgency of the Muslims around the world 
to pledge alliance to ISIS and request its followers to carry out attacks in the name of Allah. In 
a long article in the middle of this issue called “The Islamic State reports”, Dabiq reports on 
the Syrian tribes pledging loyalty to ISIS (Dabiq 1, 2014b, 12). These articles are important as 
they illustrate the importance of having declared the creation of the caliphate. In addition, they 
emphasise the inclusive element of ISIS and how the Muslims and tribes should unite to fight 
the western enemies. Dabiq tries to portray the cohesion of the group and ISIS’s relationship 
with the tribes in their area, and consequently illustrate how the caliphate is targeted by the 
Western troops to undermine the control of the caliph but also to attack the religion. Therefore, 
this issue explains how ISIS aims to broaden support for their objective of creating the ummah 
on the one hand, while at the other hand triggering and justifying the use of violence by other 
ISIS cells to continue the fighting of the group in Syria to secure their caliphate in the region. 
 In the same issue in a long article on Islamic leadership, Dabiq reflects on what 
might be the most appropriate strategy to fight these Western Crusaders by relying on guerrilla 
strategies and choose easy targets with the objective to exhaust the Western militaries (Dabiq 
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1, 2014c. 23). The article in Dabiq explains that creating chaos and targeting the infrastructure 
of the enemy would result in their defeat in the long term in Syria and enabling ISIS to expand 
its control. ISIS also justifies this strategy by emphasising the hostility of other groups and 
exploiting the animosity of the Sunnis. The secondary literature, from Cheterian, and Ryan, 
provide a context on how to interpret this article. They argued that this article in Dabiq relates 
to Naji’s jihadist strategy (Cheterian 2015, 133; Ryan 2014). The use of terror and guerrilla-
attacks against the enemies’ resources would weaken the western resistance, while terrorist 
attacks would create chaos and savagery among the local population, and lastly would enable 
the consolidation of the caliphate.  
 The articles in Dabiq and Rumiyah consistently use theological references and 
historic events to explain how the caliphate will win its war against the enemy and to illustrate 
why ISIS has an advantage (because they are supported by Allah) over the enemy. For instance, 
in an article on the survival of the Islamic State in the beginning of the second issue of Dabiq, 
the author uses the story of Noah and the float to illustrate that God washed away all the infidels 
and that only the believers at that time survived (Dabiq 2, 2014e, 5). This reference is used to 
clarify how ISIS with the will of god will extinguish all its enemies. With Allah’s support, ISIS 
will defeat all the enemies like the float did to the infidels in Noah’s story. 
 In the issues of Dabiq, the Kurds are also specifically targeted. The PKK 
(Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê/ Kurdish Workers Party), which is a Marxist group striving for 
the independence of Kurdistan, would harm the faith in the Islam by following other ideologies 
(Marxism and nationalism) alongside the Islam. In ISIS’s perception, combining this religion 
with other ideologies would harm the devotion to Allah. This point is clarified in an article in 
a long article in the fourth issue of Dabiq which clarifies the caliphates position on the PKK: 
Our war with Kurds is a religious war. It is not a nationalistic war – we seek the refuge of Allah. We do not fight 
Kurds because they are Kurds. Rather we fight the disbelievers amongst them, the allies of the crusaders and Jews 
in their war against the Muslims. As for the Muslim Kurds, then they are our people and brothers wherever they 
may be. We spill our blood to save their blood (Dabiq 4, 2014f, 5).  
 
 Exactly this sentiment of the Kurds being nationalist and Marxist and neglecting their Islamic 
roots would legitimise the use of violence against groups like the PKK. Herein, ISIS makes it 
perfectly clear that the organisation is not against the Kurds, as long as the Kurds would convert 
to ISIS’s religion. ISIS is not necessarily at war with the Kurds, they would even be allies and 
part of ISIS’s ummah, but they would need to abandon their nationalist and Marxist aspirations. 
In its perception, the war against the enemies is centred on the religious means rather than other 
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ideologies as Marxism, Christianity, and nationalism or capitalism. In the same article, ISIS 
also states that it fights the American and European troops, because they started the war against 
the caliphate (Dabiq 4, 2014g, 8). Therefore, the organisation would only defend its territory 
and punish the Western troops for starting the war. 
 The group’s conception of the Western enemies is also demonstrated in a brief 
in article in the middle of the fifteenth issue of Dabiq in which it extensively describes why 
ISIS hates the West and fights them: 
 We hate you, first and foremost, because you are disbelievers; you reject the oneness of Allah by making partners 
for Him in worship, you blaspheme against Him, claiming that He has a son, you fabricate lies against His prophets 
and messengers, and you indulge in all manner of devilish practices. […] We hate you because your secular, 
liberal societies permit the very things that Allah has prohibited while banning many of the things He has 
permitted, […] We hate you for your crimes against the Muslims; and your puppets in the usurped lands of the 
Muslims oppress, torture, and wage war against anyone who calls to the truth. As such, we fight you to stop you 
from killing our men, women, and children, to liberate those of them whom you imprison and torture, and to take 
revenge for the countless Muslims who’ve suffered as a result of your deeds. […] We hate you for invading our 
lands and fight you to repel you and drive you out. As long as there is an inch of territory left for us to reclaim, 
jihad will continue to be a personal obligation on every single Muslim (Dabiq 15, 2015a, 31-32).” 
 
This important excerpt illustrates the organisation’s vision on why they hate the West and why 
they are the enemy. ISIS explains that the Western values are in conflict with its own values 
and that the rejection of the Islam makes them an enemy of all those who do belief. Therefore, 
ISIS legitimises violence against non-Muslim groups as a reaction to the Western values which 
it deems as wrong and harmful to the religion. At the same time, ISIS’s use of violence is a 
response to the Western harmful operations and marginalisation of the Sunnis in Iraq and Syria. 
ISIS maintains that the West has structurally targeted the Sunnis and that violence would be an 
answer to the Western oppression and targeting of the Muslims. In ISIS’s perception, the use 
of violence against the western crusaders would be to defend the religion, and retaliate for all 
the losses of the Muslims in the caliphate.   
 ISIS’s bases its legitimisation of violence to defend the religion and to punish 
the west for its actions in the Middle East. However, the articles in its magazine also aim to 
create a homogeneous in-group by emphasising the religious fundaments of the organisation. 
For instance, in a short article in the seventh issue of Dabiq on the enslavement of its female 
prisoners, the author justifies the use Jihadist fundaments by repeating how this is encouraged 
by the Qur’an (Dabiq 7, 2015b, 14). Celso, has related the ritualistic violence as portrayed in 
this issue to illustrate how Al-Zarqawi’s jihadist fundaments have formed the basis for ISIS to 
structure its caliphate according the religious texts. The execution of prisoners, the mass 
killings of other religious groups, such as the Yezidis, can be considered as a part of this process 
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to evaluate who embodies these jihadist principles and can be included in the ummah. The 
graphical violence urges the people in the area which ISIS conquered to make a choice: they 
are either with ISIS or they will be targeted themselves. At the same time, it mobilises foreign 
fighters as it attracts foreign excluded Muslims in the west to travel to the caliphate. 
   As a propaganda magazine, Dabiq clearly tries to mobilise its followers 
to follow ISIS in its battle against its enemies. In its foreword of the sixth issue of Dabiq, ISIS 
mobilises its readers, whether they are in the west or in the caliphate, to conduct attacks at 
every opportunity: 
 
“If you can kill a disbelieving American or Europe an – especially the spiteful and filthy French – or an Australian, 
or a Canadian, or any other disbeliever from the disbelievers waging war, including the citizens of the countries 
that entered into a coalition against the Islamic State, then rely upon Allah, and kill him in any manner or way 
however it may be. Do not ask for anyone’s advice and do not seek anyone’s verdict (Dabiq 6, 2014h, 4).” 
 
 
This excerpt was published after a follower of ISIS conducted a terrorist attack in Sydney on 
14-15 December. Consequently, this excerpt illustrates how ISIS calls for its followers to 
terrorise the West, like the attack in Sydney. At the same time, this excerpt illustrates how the 
organisation relies on its foreign fighters and their terrorist attacks. By emphasising these 
fighter’s role in the caliphate, the magazine tries to convince its foreign followers that they are 
part of the caliphate and should terrorise the crusaders. 
  Dividing ISIS’s caliphate from the apostates and the crusaders forms the 
strategy to protect the caliphate from the demonised West who seeks to divide the caliphate. In 
the first article of the first issue of Rumiyah, “The religion of the Islam and the Jama’ah 
[gathering] of Muslims”, the author illustrates how the ummah should remain united and fight 
collectively against the infidels: 
 
“So, whoever comes to divide the matter of this Ummah while it is united, then strike him – whoever he may be 
– with the sword. […] Whoever comes to you wanting to break your strength or divide your unity [ISIS’s ummah] 
while your matter is altogether under a single man, then kill him [i.e. the agitator].” He also said, “If bay’ah 
[pledge of allegiance] is given to two khalifahs [caliphs], then kill the second of them. […] O Allah, make the 
conquest of Constantinople and Rome be at our hands and make us from among your patient and grateful slaves 
(Rumiyah 1, 2016. 8)” 
 
With this text, ISIS encourages the readers to maintain faith in the Caliph and remain unified. 
At the same time, this text also clearly illustrates that all the infidels trying to defeat ISIS are 
the enemies should be killed. The article would try to insinuate to its followers to remain unified 
when ISIS enemies would attack them, and strengthen the cohesion of the Ummah when the 
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caliphate is under attack. The first issue of Rumiyah was published when ISIS started to lose 
territory and influence. For that reason, the article aims to inspire the ummah to remain unified 
even when it is under attack and collectively resist all the attacks and remain faith in the caliph. 
However, this excerpt can also be considered as ISIS aspiring to expand its caliphate. ISIS will 
continue to fight until the caliphate has conquered Rome and the rest of the West.  
 
ISIS use of violence against Islamic out-groups 
ISIS’s use of violence is illustrative for its strategy, because it enforces ISIS’s identity and 
mobilises outsiders to join the group. The organisation’s explicit use of violence fits this 
objective of creating a boundary between who belongs to ISIS and who it wants to join and 
who the organisation considers to be the enemy. The importance of repeatedly clarifying who 
belongs to ISIS and to inspire its followers to use violence functions to strengthen its members 
dedication to the caliphate by prioritising the shared in-group’s background by focusing on the 
Sunni’s anger for other Muslim groups who deny the caliphate. In a lengthy article on the 
imams in the West in the ninth issue of Dabiq, ISIS frames every person claiming to be a 
Muslim while not joining the caliphate to be apostates: 
The person who calls himself a “Muslim” but unapologetically commits blatant kufr [disbelieve] is not a munāfiq 
(hypocrite), as some mistakenly claim. Rather, he is a murtadd (apostate). […] The ruling of the person who 
commits riddah [apostacy] is that he is killed, unless he repents before he is apprehended (Dabiq 9, 2015c. 7) 
 
In this significant text, the author legitimises the targeting of other Muslims. ISIS claims that 
the use of violence is permitted against other Muslim groups to defeat the apostates. The 
beheadings, and other forms of violence is permitted on the principle of mirroring the crimes 
befallen upon the organisation. ISIS targets other Muslims not only because they would not 
follow ISIS’s interpretation of the Islam, but also because they reject to obey the rule of the 
caliphate.  
 ISIS’s use of violence against the Islamic enemies could convince the Muslims 
in the region to join ISIS, as it would empower the Sunnis and convert their position as being 
marginalised and subjected to non-Sunni control. Moreover, ISIS legitimises its use of violence 
against Muslim out-groups by explaining how these groups are kaftir (enemies of the Sunnah). 
Violence would be justified as these kaftir groups have lost faith and betrayed the Ummah. 
This is also illustrated in an article on Dabiq issue 13:  
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“We clarify to all that the Islamic State’s position is clear concerning the ruling on these factions [Shia groups, 
and other Muslim factions fighting in Syria], and it is that they are groups that have apostatized from the religion 
of Allah and have committed numerous deeds that have nullified the fundamentals of the religion. From amongst 
these deeds is that they fight a state that rules by the Sharī’ah of Allah while these factions are in one trench and 
one coalition with other factions that have resisted the implementation of the Shari’ah and declared their efforts 
to build a ‘democratic, civil, pluralistic’[…] All this is done with support and direct air cover from the American-
led crusader coalition that only strives to destroy the mission of the Khilāfah [caliph] […] the above statement, 
along with the operations conducted by the soldiers of the Khilāfah against the factions of apostasy in all their 
colors, make it clear that the Islamic State does not differentiate between those murtaddīn [apostate] who 
shamelessly ally with the disbelievers against the Muslims due to their openly secularist disposition, and those 
murtaddīn who do so using false pretexts while taking desperate and futile measures to try and maintain an 
“Islamic” image. (Dabiq issue 13, 2015d, 14).” 
 
This excerpt comes from a report on ISIS’s missions in Syria and clarifies that ISIS fight its 
Islamic enemies because they follow the orders of the Western Crusader. Moreover, ISIS 
clarifies that in its perception, it does not differentiate between “the crusaders” from the West 
and the Islamic enemies who would “pretend” to be devoted to the Islam, the Qur’an and the 
Sharia. As long as these Muslim groups would deny the rule of the caliph, ISIS perceives them 
as apostates who have turned against the caliphate. 
 Hence, by fighting against ISIS’s enemies differentiates between the Sunni in-
group of ISIS and all the groups who defy ISIS and try to harm its Sunni followers. The first 
article of the ninth issue of Dabiq, considers Jawhat al-Nusra as an apostate because this 
organisation would have nationalist objectives (Dabiq 8, 2015e, 7).  Targeting the other groups 
would build the legitimacy of the caliphate, because it strengthens the position of ISIS in the 
region by explaining why these groups are not Islamic enough. By fighting the other groups 
and delegitimise the other fighting fractions in the Syrian civil war ISIS restates the borders of 
the caliphate as the borders of the caliphate depend on who accept the control of ISIS or are 
expelled by ISIS violent strategy.    
 
This chapter illustrated firstly the use of Naji’s use of jihadism which has become to the centre 
of ISIS strategy to defeat the enemy as this would be the most suitable strategy. Thereafter, it 
was argued that ISIS uses violence to against the Western enemies to expel them from ISIS’s 
territory and expand its control by convincing the Sunnis to join the caliphate. In addition, 
violence against Western out-groups would secure the caliphate and convince the other Sunnis 
that ISIS is the only legitimate Sunni group. Violence against Islamic out-groups would 
function to convince other Muslims in Syria to join the caliphate, but also to defeat the apostates 
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and the Muslim groups who would be to close with the Western Crusaders. Therefore, violence 
would filter the ummah from all the Muslims who would turn against the caliphate. By 
delegitimising the other Islamic group, the followers will consider ISIS as the only valid group 
in the region. While this chapter considered the use of violence against out-groups, the next 
chapter will delve into violence within ISIS.   
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Chapter 4: ISIS’ use of violence within the caliphate 
 
Even though ISIS uses excessive violence against out-groups, the group also shapes the 
behaviour of the revolutionary in-group to comply with its attitudes. This chapter will consider 
the use of violence within the caliphate functions as a tool to pursue its revolutionary religious 
identity. In considering the inner-dynamics of the group, firstly the propaganda illustrating the 
situation will be considered. which will give an insight in the role the population is deemed to 
assume within the Islamic State. The second section will outline the sharp contrast with how 
the organisation desires to present the caliphate and how violence has been institutionalised 
and exploited. Lastly this chapter will consider the use of violence within the caliphate in 
relation to its revolutionary aspirations. 
 
ISIS projected life within the Caliphate 
In its magazine, ISIS presents the life within the caliphate as a glorious state in which the 
caliph’s followers will find a rightful place. As long as the Muslims follow the teachings of the 
Sunnah and the Sharia. In the first issue on brief article on the creation of the caliphate, ISIS 
argues that the creation of the caliphate was a necessary step to bring the Sunnis together and 
create a strong community: 
Raise your head high, for today – by Allah’s grace – you have a state and Khilafah [caliph], which will return 
your dignity, might, rights, and leadership […] It is a Khilafah that gathered the Caucasian, Indian, Chinese, 
Shami, Iraqi, Yemeni, Egyptian, Maghribi (North African), American, French, German, and Australian. Allah 
brought their hearts together, and thus, they became brothers. […]  Soon, by Allah’s permission, a day will come 
when the Muslim [Sunnis] will walk everywhere as a master, having honor, being revered, with his head raised 
high and his dignity preserved (Dabiq 1, 2014a, 6-8). 
 
The members of the caliphate and project the caliphate to be a unified wholesome state. In 
addition, the excerpt purposefully illustrate how nationality is insignificance within the 
caliphate, because only following ISIS’s interpretation of the Islam and its caliph would matter. 
This first issue of Dabiq was quickly published after the establishment of the caliphate in 2014, 
is predominantly aimed at the readers in the region. The article would convince these readers 
that its followers should jointly take upon the arms and that they are blessed by having a caliph 
who can guide them on the path of Allah.  
ISIS’s media strategy concentrates on  the one hand on identifying its enemies who 
undermine the Sunni group, and on the other hand presenting an inclusive strong organisation 
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who is protecting the interests of the Sunnis and providing security against the enemy who 
targets the Sunnis (Ingram 2015, 731). At the same time, ISIS’s media strategy follows a 
rational choice following-logic as it tries to convince that ISIS would be the logical protector 
of the Sunni Muslims and would be the only reliable organisation maintaining the “right” 
interpretation of the Qur’an and having a Caliph. Ingram, in his in-depth studies on the media 
strategy of ISIS, argues that the magazines aim to convince its readers that joining ISIS would 
be a rational choice as it is the only platform in Iraq and Syria able to provide security and 
adequately defending the religion against harmful influences. Within, its propaganda, ISIS 
portrays itself as the sole legitimate religious state defending the Islamic principles and the 
Sunnis in Iraq and Syria which makes it for its potential followers the best choice to join the 
organisation.  
 The magazine’s depiction of the caliphate offering the perfect life for Sunnis as 
in accordance with the Qur’an and the Sharia focuses on forming the Islamic State as their end 
goal. This is also stated in the article “From Hijrah to Khalifah” first issue of Dabiq in which 
ISIS explains the meaning and the importance of having declared the caliphate.  
 
“[ISIS’s] jihad would be based upon hijrah, bay’ah, sam’ [listening], ta’ah [obedience], and i’dad [training)] 
leading qital (fighting), then Khilafah [caliphate]. […] Then the events of Sham [Civil War in Syria in 2011] 
began to unfold and the Islamic State quickly got involved, answering the cries of the weak and oppressed Muslims 
by sending a mission from Iraq to activate its units in Sham and later make the announcement of its official 
expansion. […] This new condition opens the path for the complete unification of all Muslim peoples and lands 
under the single authority of the Khalifah. […] The obligation is now clearer than ever before for all Muslims to 
raise their voices and pledge their allegiance to the Khalifah – Abu Bakr al-Husayni al-Baghdad (Dabiq 1, 2014d, 
38; 40).” 
 
 
In this important passage, it becomes clear, that the focus of ISIS lays on maintaining the 
caliphate and restore the status of the Muslims in the Middle East. In this phase, after having 
announced the creation of the caliphate, the magazine aspires to exploit the pride of the 
Muslims by arguing how ISIS and the caliph want to restore the status of the Muslims in the 
Middle East. In addition, this text also emphasises that all the Muslims would be obliged to 
pledge loyalty to the caliph.  
 The creation of the caliphate was both a strategic consequence and a religious 
choice. According Wood, who has reflected on the significance and the role of the caliph. The 
caliph has religious authority as he represents the prophet and would be the most religiously 
educated imam and knows how to lead the ummah (Wood 2015). However, having declared 
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the caliphate also brings responsibilities. The caliph’s position is constructed on religious 
authority, but also has a political factor as the caliph would rule over its territory (Wood 2015). 
At the same time, the formation of the caliphate has a mobilising role as it would pressure all 
the Muslims to accept the caliph’s rule and travel to join the ummah. Therefore, the 
construction of the caliphate would expand its population. It also shaped the behaviour of the 
followers as the caliphate would enforce the rule of the Islam which forces its subjects to follow 
this and adjust their lives in accordance with the Qur’an. This is also illustrated by ISIS’s 
propaganda which clarifies how its citizens ought to behave. 
 To build and structure the caliphate, ISIS aims to provide the infrastructure and 
presents that it has all the facilities to construct an independent state-like territory. On some 
occasions, Dabiq and Rumiyah give a glans of the living conditions. In the ninth issue of Dabiq 
in an article called “the Islamic State reports”, ISIS presents that the caliphate has created two 
medical schools in Raqqa and in Mosul. Students would be offered free education, housing and 
health care (Dabiq 9, 2015f, 26). Therefore, ISIS built medical facilities in Raqqa and Mosul 
and provides education to all the children. The caliphate would have built modern medical 
schools with state of the art equipment. Throughout several of its issues of Dabiq, ISIS 
advertises that it will reintroduce the currency which was used by the prophet Muhammed. By 
reintroducing this currency, ISIS emphasises the importance of the prophet and the Islam, while 
it also removes the remainders of the previous regimes. Therefore, destroying and replacing 
the infrastructure would also legitimise ISIS’s control.  
 In its propaganda, discusses the role of men and women within the caliphate.  
ISIS frames it as the man’s duty to fight in the name of Allah and protect the Islam against her 
enemies. They argue the man’s role is to participate in the organisation’s armed struggle. For 
example, in this article on the role of men as soldiers in the sixth issue of Dabiq, it urges the 
men to fight for their caliph by giving them tips on how to fight and by emphasising the 
opportunity for the faithful jihadists to gain access to the paradise if they have remained faithful 
and fought for the Islam (Dabiq 6, 2014i, 6). In the caliphate, men are expected to take 
leadership and carry out attacks in the name of the caliphate. Likewise, in a recurring column: 
“among the believers are men”, the magazine boasts the role of men as leaders and protectors 
of the caliphate. Within this column, the magazine describes the life of one of its soldier who 
participates in ISIS’s armed struggle. This column in the thirteenth issue of Dabiq, the 
magazine portrays how Jihadi John, who was a Brit, has travelled to the caliphate to fight 
against the Western crusaders as he was unhappy with his life in London (Dabiq 13, 2015g. 
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22).  The objective of this column is to convince other Muslims in the west to join the caliphate, 
but also to set an example on how the men in the area should behave as soldiers. This column 
idolises the most dedicated soldiers in the hope that the other men will follow their example. 
  On the other hand, the magazine clarifies that women play a secondary role, 
and are supportive to their husbands and mother the children in the caliphate. The magazine 
also portrays the role of women. In her column: “from our sisters” written by Umm Sumayyah 
al-Muhājirah who is a Finnish married jihadist woman living in the caliphate. She reflects on 
the role of the women and wives in the caliphate. In the tenth issue of Dabiq, she argues in her 
columns on how women should assist the soldiers and the protectors of their families in the 
caliphate by parenting and baring their children and how the men of the caliphate are romantic 
and passionate. At the same time, her articles are also aimed at the Western Muslimas and try 
to convince them to travel to the caliphate by promising them a dedicated mujahedeen husband 
(Dabiq 10, 2015h, 42-47). In the eleventh issue of Dabiq in the same column, Umm Sumayyah 
al-Muhājirah again illustrates this romantic picture for the women living in the ummah, where 
their husbands take care for them and the women would get housing and all the care they need, 
so that they can fulfil their desire of being a dedicated wife and mother (Dabiq 11, 2015i, 42-
47). Hence, she encourages the woman to carry as many children as possible and obey the men 
within the caliphate. 
 
Use of violence within the Caliphate 
ISIS desires to project the existence of the caliphate forming a strong state in which the 
members of the caliphate are happy and obey to the rule of the caliph. However, there seems 
to be stark contrast in which the organisation uses violence to force compliance to its rule. Even 
though the magazines present the caliphate as a strongly unified ummah in which the 
organisation is unified in its religion and having a strong in-group, the reality sheds a caliphate 
in which the living conditions are harsh (General Intelligence and Security Service 2016, 10). 
The Dutch Secret Service, as one of the view intelligence services in the West, has been able 
to extensively encapsulate the life within the caliphate and has been able to refute the 
propaganda in the online magazine. The housing which would be offered to new members does 
not have electricity for more than a couple of hours in the week. Medical services would be 
offered, but would come at a high price while also not being sufficient and adequate. In 
addition, ISIS in Raqqa and Mosul would form a strictly supervised stronghold of ISIS in which 
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the religious police keeps the population in check and certify that the Islam is lived after by the 
population (Bouckaert 2015).  
 The punishment of religious offenders is illustrated in the seventh issue of Dabiq 
in a brief reportage on life within the Islamic State. In this article “clamping down on sexual 
deviance, the article reports on how sexual deviance, such as homosexuality, rape, and being 
in possession of pornography, are punished by stoning, or throwing from buildings (Dabiq 7, 
2015j, 42-43). These “offenders” were punished in Raqqa and Mosul in which the caliphate 
has the strongest hold on the population and which are the most significant cities in the 
caliphate. The reporting of these punishments might function to set an example on how the 
other regions under ISIS’s control need to enact the Sharia.  Even though, the article gives no 
time framework or indication of frequency of carrying out these punishments, the western 
media has reported that in Raqqa suspected sexual deviants are consistently punished 
(Bouckaert 2015; Saul 2015; Wedeman 2016). According to Bouckaert, the subjects in the 
Islamic State would already be punished for wearing jeans or eating food from “the Crusaders’ 
lands” which insinuates that these types of punishments are a normality. 
 Like sexual deviants, ISIS also threats women differently than just being the 
obedient wives and mothers. Whereas Umm Sumayyah al- Muhājirah’s column on the role of 
women illustrates a romantic picture of the women in the caliphate, in her column in the ninth 
issue of Dabiq also justifies the enslavement of apostate women (Dabiq 9, 2015k, 44). She 
argues that the sexual enslavement of women is acceptable, because they refused to convert to 
the Islam and pledge their loyalty to the caliph. Therefore, she justifies the enslavement of 
women as this would be a liberation for the slaves. In the slaves’ new live within the ummah, 
they would learn to how to become a good Muslima. Ahram thoroughly analyses the online 
media publications in relation to the sexual violence within the ummah. She maintains that the 
sexual enslavement and mistreatment of women would sustain the religious hierarchy of the 
Sunni having control over the other religious groups such as Yazidis and Christians within the 
caliphate and project the supremacy of the Islam (Ahram 2015, 59). Sexual violence, structures 
the behaviour of the population as the enslavement of apostates illustrates how the Sunnis 
would be better and rule over these other communities.  
ISIS and its revolution  
Social revolutions originate from a bottom-up process in which the population of a former out-
group collectively aim to get into power and change society according to its interests. In his 
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evaluation of ISIS being a revolutionary group, Kalyvas suggests that ISIS not only desires to 
take power, but also wants to transform society to live in accordance with its religious identity 
(2015, 43). Walt asserts that ISIS, just as revolutionary movements, uses indoctrination, 
induction and violence to encourage obedience of their followers (2015, 43). In Walt’s view, 
ISIS would pressure its followers into accepting ISIS’s revolution. Violence within the 
caliphate filters the ummah from who obeys and embody the group’s revolutionary objective 
caliphate. The use of violence filters the ummah from the subjects within its territory who 
decline to obey with the ummah. Hence, it would force the subjects under ISIS’s control into 
compliance or to flee. In addition, violence would also punish the subjects who violated the 
Islamic laws and secures ISIS’s control over them. ISIS formed an alternative inclusive 
political movement in which the local tribes and the non-Sunni ethnic minorities within the 
region of control could channel the religious agenda.  
 Moreover, ISIS’s revolution has a unique trans-national context. ISIS not only 
targets the Iraqi and Syria government, but instead ISIS strived for its revolution in a trans-
national border region between Iraq and Syria (Byman 2016). ISIS’s revolution unfolds in a 
transnational region without seeking to take over the existing political institutions, but rather 
create its own religious state supported by the Sunnis and other groups subjecting or accepting 
ISIS’s rule. Lastly, ISIS’s quest to expand by stimulating Western Muslims gives ISIS’s 
ongoing revolution a global dimension as even though the territory is in the Middle East, the 
followers can still be part of the caliphate outside of its geographical physical territory. While 
violence functions to secure control over its in-group, it also mobilises potential jihadists from 
the West, because the propaganda brag about the strength of the organisation and attract new 
members. 
  
This chapter reflected on the use of violence within the caliphate and ISIS’s propaganda and 
ideological message of having established a caliphate in which its subjects would live a happy 
life. In the online magazines, the role of the ummah is on several occasions clarified with the 
men having to fight against the enemies of ISIS and women solely serving as mothers and 
wives to the soldiers. Similarly, the propaganda portrays the caliphate to be the only Islamic 
territory completely carrying out the true religion and having the capabilities to carry out its 
duties as a state by offering housing and healthcare facilities. The reality, however, is different 
as news sources and intelligence services has proven that the living conditions are horrendous.  
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The subjects of the caliphate are violently forced into accepting ISIS’s rule and endure its 
violent law enforcement. Women are being subjected to be wives and having the duty of being 
used for having children and to obey the men in the caliphate or even becoming sex slaves.   
 The articles in the magazines portraying the living conditions remain scarce, 
with only one article aiming to boast its effort to offer education. This might be because, the 
living conditions would damage the propaganda objective of the magazines and would 
discourage its followers to travel to the caliphate. Nevertheless, Violence within the caliphate 
is applied to create a homogeneous ummah and strengthens the revolutionary objective of the 
group which complies with the rule of the Qur’an. Hence, violence within the caliphate clarifies 
who is included in the revolutionary process and filters the ummah from the population who 
do not embody the formation of the Islamic state or who can be forced to comply with the rule 
of the caliph.  
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Conclusion 
 
The rise of ISIS and its rapid increase of influence in North-Eastern Syria in this civil war has 
been remarkable. Upon entering the Syrian civil war in 2011, ISIS constructed a stronghold in 
Raqqa and controlled its population from this city. During the Syrian civil war and the 
formation of the Caliphate in 2014, ISIS expanded its territory and its strict control over the 
population. In order to understand this drastic evolution and expansion of the organisation, a 
social revolutionary perspective is useful as it enhances the understanding of the groups’ use 
of violence to accomplish its revolution. By evaluating the use of violence, this analysis gave 
a unique perspective on ISIS’s process of forming an Islamic State. Process tracing enabled an 
in-depth analysis on ISIS’s development and how violence has enabled the organisation to 
manifest and develop in Iraq and Syria. In addition, the use of primary sources strengthens the 
analysis of how violence contributes ISIS’s revolution. 
  The literature on ISIS has differentiated three themes in the literature on ISIS. 
The first one being the historical context of the organisation. Tracing the foundation of the 
organisation goes back to both fundamental differences between Al-Qaeda and ISIS in which 
the latter adopted a more violent strategy within the Middle East. At the same time, the 
literature also traces the origins of ISIS to the American invasion in Iraq. The second debate 
focuses on the explicit use of violence in relation to their ideological message against enemies. 
The last debate, focused on how ISIS presents itself and how propaganda is used in relation to 
the actual dire harsh control of the organisation within their caliphate. The remainder of the 
literature review considered the literature of social revolutions and especially those studies 
focused on the unfolding of social revolutions in the Middle East. In the Middle East, 
revolutions are escalating into civil wars and paired with mass violence against the resisting 
groups. 
 The historical context on the evolution of ISIS considered the development of 
the organisation between 2003-2014. Within this chapter, the formation of the organisation as 
a gradual process in which the organisation became frustrated within Al-Qaeda’s structure of 
focusing against the enemy in the West rather than on the Shia regimes or unjust corrupt 
regimes in the Middle East. In addition, the lack of action against ethnic groups such as the 
Shias and the Sunni formation of Al-Qaeda created a rift between ISI and Al-Qaeda.  At the 
same time, the Iraq War in 2003, a weak Shia government was formed and started 
marginalising the Sunni majority. Hence, ISI incorporated the Sunni communities and tribes 
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and conducted attacks against the Shia control to expand its control. ISI exploited the lack of 
Shia state control and chaos as it expanded its territory and influence for its sectarian Sunni 
agenda. The ideological roots were already present when ISI was part of Al-Qaeda, but the 
context in which ISI could freely develop from Al-Qaeda was exploited in the aftermath of the 
Iraq war as ISI exploits chaos to take control of the regional tribes. Hence ISIS developed as 
an interplay between its rift with Al-Qaeda and the lack of state control in Iraq. This 
exploitation of chaos was later also the ideal context in which ISIS entered the civil war in 
Syria in 2011. 
 In the third chapter, the role of violence against out-groups was considered. 
Firstly, the use of violence as an Islamic-revolutionary element was considered by evaluating 
the fundamental jihadist book of Naji. Naji has theorised when and how the ummah can be 
constructed by using violence. In this book, Naji explains that jihadist strategies should focus 
on exhausting the enemy and in the long term expels the enemy from the jihadist territory 
enabling the groups to create the caliphate. In ISIS’s perception, the use of violence is 
legitimised as it would offer salvation to the Sunnis living under control of the apostates and 
crusaders. By shedding a harsh division between ISIS and its enemies, it legitimises the use of 
violence and create this vision in which violence functions to protect the caliphate from its 
enemies. At the same time, Islamic out-groups are targeted by ISIS, because these groups 
would have lost the truth sense of believing and by claiming that it apostacy can only be 
retaliated defeating the unjust Islamic groups. The creation of this boundary between the enemy 
and ISIS, the revolutionary group creates a common enemy which needs to be defeated by the 
caliphate, and strengthens ISIS’s identity by emphasising the enemies lurking to defeat the 
ummah. 
 The last chapter focused on the projection of ISIS’ internal community and the 
stark contrast beyond their propaganda and western intelligence reports and news reports. In 
the issues of Dabiq and Rumiyah, ISIS presents that life within the caliphate is a paradise for 
every dedicated Muslim and that it would be the moral obligation of like-minded Muslims to 
join the caliphate. In its magazine, ISIS repeatedly creates this image on how the living 
conditions and its society presents this image in which living within the caliphate would be a 
glory. ISIS actively pursues the teachings of the Quran and the Sharia. The Caliphate uses 
violence to correct, but also to shape the behaviour of their community. Hence, by using 
violence, the organisation shapes the ummah to embody ISIS’s revolution. In addition, violence 
also filters the ummah to create this internal division on who is included and accepts the rule 
of ISIS and who is an apostate and should be excluded. While violence, is justified as the 
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organisation considers it as a religious punishment to apostates, it also filters its community on 
who is a dedicated Muslim fitting with ISIS jihadist’s roots and embodying its objective of 
strengthening the caliphate. 
 The revolution violently unfolds as it functions to differentiate ISIS from its 
enemies and project them as violent crusaders and apostates attempting to destroy the Islam. 
Hence, violence strengthens the internal cohesion and the ummah’s dedication to the revolution 
of the organisation. At the same time, violence is also essential within the ummah as it serves 
to correct the behaviour of ISIS’s followers, but also to homogenise and create a cohesive 
ummah from the subjects. The hypothesis that violence functions to protect and expand the 
caliphate, but also to filter its subjects into a dedicated group complying with ISIS’s rule is 
correct. Therefore, the conclusion must be drawn that ISIS uses violence to consolidate and 
expand its caliphate by demonising its enemies which would legitimise its use of violence. At 
the same time, ISIS also uses violence to create a homogeneous revolutionary group who 
embodies ISIS’s revolution, as they are forced to obey ISIS’s rule and follow its strict 
interpretation of the Islam. Hence, violence against out-groups’ functions to protect its Islamic 
State and even expand its control, and violence within the caliphate legitimises the rule of ISIS. 
 While this thesis focused on the evaluation of ISIS as a revolutionary group 
using violence to achieve its revolution, it also opens the possibilities for future research. Future 
research can focus on how ISIS tries to incorporate its foreign fighters into its revolution. In 
addition, future research should also focus on how other Islamic groups use violence and 
jihadist strategies to achieve their revolutions. Another potential research dimension could be 
how the states in the Middle East can prevent the outbreak of social revolutions and how they 
can incorporate the different religious groups into the political process. Lastly, the use of 
violence by revolutionary groups is largely overlooked and especially in the context of the 
escalation of violence during Civil Wars, and insurgencies. For that reason, scholars should 
also go deeper into the connection between social revolutions and other forms of resistance.  
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